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Honderich and the Curse of
Epiphenomenalism
In ‘Radical Externalism’1 Ted Honderich offers an ingenious and radi-
cal new solution to the problem of consciousness — a solution that
promises, among other things, to do justice to two important features
of consciousness — to both its subjectivity and its causal efficacy.
According to Honderich, the main alternatives to his own Radical
Externalism are certain forms of dualism, or, as he puts it, ‘spiritual-
ism’, and ‘devout physicalism’. Honderich’s central argument for
Radical Externalism is that it succeeds in respecting those features of
consciousness to which these two main alternatives fail to do justice.
It is, therefore, the superior theory.
But is Radical Externalism superior? Does it have this advantage
over its two main rivals?
I don’t believe it does. The central argument of this paper is that
Radical Externalism falls foul of much the same kinds of problems
concerning causal interaction that plague spiritualism. Indeed, ironi-
cally, it turns out that Radical Externalism is vulnerable to a similar
objection to that which Honderich himself cleverly levelled again
Anomalous Monism almost a quarter century ago.
But before we get to that objection, let’s begin by briefly outlining
what Honderich takes to be the two main alternatives to his own
theory — spiritualism and devout materialism — and examining their
alleged failings.
Devout Physicalism and the Problem of Subjectivity
By devout materialism Honderich means:
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the belief or perhaps attitude that our consciousness is a fact, property or
state of affairs that involves only physical properties … and in particu-
lar properties … existing and more or less anticipated [by] neuroscience
(pp. 10–11).
The devout materialist either identifies mental properties with physi-
cal properties, or else eliminates them altogether (as in eliminative
materialism).
So what’s wrong with devout physicalism? Honderich maintains it
fails, among other things, to do justice to the subjectivity of conscious-
ness. We’re all familiar with the kind of thought experiments involv-
ing black and white rooms, fool’s pain, homunculi-headed robots and
so on to which Honderich is perhaps alluding when he says
[n]o doubt theories are sometimes destroyed by single counter-
examples clearly seen, or by crucial experiments well-conducted. It
is my inclination to think this of devout physicalism … (p. 11).
It’s certainly a perennial complaint that these various kinds of
materialisms somehow fail fully to allow for the subjective quality of
conscious experience.
Spiritualism and the Problem of Causal Interaction
Which brings us to what Honderich believes is the other main alterna-
tive to his own theory — spiritualism. What characterizes the dualist
or spiritualist position, he says, is a commitment to the non-spatiality
of consciousness. Spiritualism, says Honderich, is
the theory, rightly associated with Descartes, that your consciousness is
somehow non-spatial and hence not physical. It is in fact only mislead-
ingly called dualism, mainly because its distinctive nature and its prob-
lems are not owed to its asserting that consciousness is other than
physical but rather to its asserting that consciousness is out of space and
in fact of a mysterious nature (p. 11).
The problems that plague spiritualism, says Honderich, include the
problem of causal interaction. Descartes famously attempts to place
the locus of interaction between the mental and the physical realm in
the pineal gland. But of course it remains blankly mysterious how this
interaction might take place. How can something that is not anywhere
causally impinge upon a spatio-temporally extended, physical object?
And so it seems that spiritualism also fails a key test of adequacy, in
this case, the requirement that any adequate theory of consciousness
must not make impossible what is actual, which is causal interaction
between consciousness and the physical (p. 12).
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So we appear to face an intractable dilemma so far as consciousness is
concerned. We can either favour some form of devout physicalism,
but then we fail to do justice to the subjectivity of consciousness. Or
we can embrace some variety of spiritualism, in which case we run
into the problem of causal interaction — indeed, we may find
ourselves unable to prevent a slide into epiphenomenalism (or
occasionalism or pre-established harmony theory, or whatever).
I’m sure many philosophers of mind would acknowledge that we do
at least face something like the dilemma that Honderich presents us
with. Indeed, finding a way out of this sort of dilemma has surely been
one of the main preoccupations of philosophers of mind for the last
couple of decades.
The question is: does Honderich’s new alternative — his third way,
as it were — actually allow us to resolve the dilemma? Does it really
let us do justice to both of these features of consciousness: to both its
subjectivity and its causal efficacy?
It’s immediately obvious that we might attempt to mount an attack
on Radical Externalism from at least one of two directions. First, we
might argue that, actually, like devout materialism, Radical
Externalism fails to do justice to the subjectivity of consciousness. Or
we might try to show that, like spiritualism, Radical Externalism faces
problems in allowing for causal interaction. Or we might do both these
things.
While I suspect Radical Externalism probably does face problems
with respect to subjectivity (see the end of this paper), it’s on problems
with causal interaction that I’ll focus here. As Honderich’s case for
Radical Externalism is that it avoids those problems that respectively
plague spiritualism and devout materialism, establishing that Radical
Externalism does indeed run straight into much the same old problems
regarding causal interaction as does spiritualism would suffice seri-
ously to undercut his case.
Radical Externalism
Let me briefly sketch out both what I take Radical Externalism to be,
and how I believe Honderich supposes it allows us to resolve the
dilemma outlined above.
At the heart of Radical Externalism lies something Honderich calls
worlds of perceptual consciousness. One important feature of a world
of perceptual consciousness is that it is not located ‘in the head’ (not at
all, in fact, unless e.g. you happen to be looking at your own brain). It
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encompasses the same tracts of space that those objects of which you
are perceptually aware occupy. Hence the ‘Radical Externalism’.
And yet, despite being spatially extended, a world of perceptual
consciousness is also supposed to be subjective.
In what sense subjective? Well, a world of perceptual conscious-
ness is something you have. Our worlds of perceptual consciousness
are numerically distinct. You have yours. I have mine. When you and I
simultaneously look at an orange placed on a table in front of us, our
worlds of perceptual consciousness may spatially overlap. But still,
while we may be conscious of the same orange, there are nevertheless
two worlds of perceptual consciousness involved here, not one. Each
subject has their own world of perceptual consciousness.
A corollary of this is that a world of perceptual consciousness is
only immediately accessible to its owner. A world of perceptual con-
sciousness is, in this sense, a private world. This kind of privacy is of
course commonly supposed to be one of the hallmarks of the subjec-
tive (yet note that we are still dealing with a radical form of
externalism here — we’re not talking about inner Cartesian theatres,
or anything like that).
There’s at least one further way in which a world of perceptual con-
sciousness would seem to qualify as subjective. A world of perceptual
consciousness is subjective in that
[w]ith consciousness, what there seems to be is what there is. What
there seems to be is all there is (p. 5).
This, I take it, is the familiar claim that while I might be mistaken
about there actually being an orange on the table in front of me, I can’t
be mistaken about the fact that that is how things subjectively seem to
me. Within a world of perceptual consciousness, appearance is king.
You can’t, as it were, have fool’s x, where x is something that features
within your world of perceptual consciousness.
Resolving the Dilemma
How, then, does the introduction of worlds of perceptual conscious-
ness allow us to resolve the dilemma sketched out earlier? How does it
succeed in doing justice both to the subjectivity of consciousness and
its causal efficacy?
Let’s start with subjectivity. That Honderich’s worlds of perceptual
consciousness do at least do justice to the subjectivity of conscious-
ness might seem obvious. They make perceptual consciousness some-
thing you have, and they also respect the fact that the illusion/reality
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distinction collapses when it comes to conscious experience. They are
also private. So perhaps the subjectivity of consciousness is indeed
taken care of.
But what of causal interaction between the mental and the physical?
How do they allow for that? Well, remember that, according to
Honderich, the problem spiritualism faces concerning causal interac-
tion is simply this: how can something that is non-spatial causal
impinge upon the physical? Honderich’s worlds of perceptual experi-
ence do indeed appear to sidestep this problem, for the simply reason
that they are spatial.
So it might seem that Honderich’s Radical Externalism does indeed
allow us to do justice to both the subjectivity of consciousness and its
causal efficacy. A pretty neat trick, if successful.
Unfortunately, I don’t believe it is successful, as I’ll now try to
explain. In particular, some very serious problems concerning causal
interaction appear to remain.
Honderich outlines one problem about causal efficacy facing
spiritualism — the problem of how the non-spatial might causally
impinge on the physical. And perhaps Radical Externalism does suc-
ceed in sidestepping that problem. The problem is that that is not the
only problem. In fact, spiritualism faces far more serious difficulties
concerning causal interaction, including the kind of difficulty that
Honderich earlier raised for anomalous monism.
The problem for Honderich, as I’ll try to show below, is that Radi-
cal Externalism faces much the same kind of difficulty concerning
causal interaction.
Honderich’s Attack on Anomalous Monism
Let’s begin by briefly reminding ourselves of Honderich’s own earlier
attack on Davidson’s anomalous monism (Honderich, 1982).
Anomolous monism itself arose in part out of a problem concerning
the causal efficacy of the mental. According to Davidson, there can be
a causal relationship between events only if they fall under some law.
But there are no psychophysical laws. So how then can mental events
cause physical events?
Davidson’s solution is to point out that laws relate events only
under some description or other. A token mental event a can cause a
physical event b if a is also a physical event. For then a and b can both
fall under some physical description and so some physical law. But
because there are no psycho-physical laws — no laws under which
mental events described as mental cause physical events, so there can
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be no possibility of a type-identity between mental and physical
events.
So Davidson’s anomalous monism claims that token mental events
are token physical events. But it seems that these token events have
two quite distinct sorts of property: mental properties and physical
properties. The mental properties of an event are neither identical with
nor reducible to its physical properties. So it appears that anomalous
monism is still committed to a form of dualism — namely, a form of
property dualism.
Which brings me to Honderich’s attack on anomalous monism.
Back in 1982, Honderich cleverly pointed out that while Davidson
does indeed allow mental events to have causal efficacy, it seems that
epiphenomenalism still threatens. The problem is that while anoma-
lous monism may allow mental events to have causal clout, it’s not in
virtue of their mental properties that they have such clout. You could
entirely strip away the mental properties of an event, and its physical
efficacy would remain undiminished. But, as Honderich puts it, it’s
surely mental events as mental that have causal efficacy. Honderich
concludes that Davidson thus fails to do justice to one of our funda-
mental intuitions about the mental. Surely the mental properties of
events are causally relevant. Anomalous monism makes them
epiphenomenal. So anomalous monism won’t do.
Why Non-Spatiality Is Not the Only, Or the Most Serious,
Problem Concerning Causal Efficacy Facing spiritualisms
Honderich’s argument against anomalous monism is neat, clear, and
telling. But notice that it has nothing to do with the non-spatiality of
the mental. (Indeed, notice that it’s not even clear that anomalous
monism makes mental properties non-spatial. If physical events are
spatially located, and physical events have mental properties, then
why aren’t mental properties also spatially located?) Indeed, surely
the Really Big Problem about the causal efficacy of the mental so far
as dualism more generally is concerned is not that it makes the mental
non-spatial (for, as I say, it’s not clear property dualism has to make
the mental non-spatial, and in any case we might question whether the
concept of cause requires both a cause and its effect to be spatially
located).2 In fact, what more often than not tends to force modern
dualists in the direction of epiphenomenalism are not worries about
the non-spatiality of the mental role so much as worries about the
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absence of psycho-physical laws and/or worries about the causal clo-
sure of the physical — in particular, the worry that if every physical
event has a sufficient physical condition, then the mental ends up
being causally locked out of the physical domain. As I say, this sort of
worry about causal interaction is quite independent of any worries
generated by the alleged non-spatiality of the mental.
But then a problem for Radical Externalism is this. Maybe it does
sidestep one of the problems for spiritualism concerning causal inter-
action. By making worlds of perceptual consciousness spatial
Honderich does perhaps avoid the problem of explaining how the
non-spatial might impinge on the physical (though I have my doubts
even about this: even if I acknowledge that a ‘phantom’ pain produced
by a severed limb is spatially located [in thin air], that, by itself, still
leaves it blankly mysterious how this pain might have any causal
impact on the physical). But that is not the only problem dualism faces
so far as causal interaction is concerned. Indeed, it may yet turn out
that Radical Externalism is vulnerable to some of the other classic
problems.
In fact it seems to me that Radical Externalism is vulnerable. For
much the same kind of argument that Honderich wields against anom-
alous monism can be used against his own Radical Externalism.
Let’s return to worlds of perceptual consciousness. They are sup-
posed to solve the problem of causal efficacy by making conscious-
ness spatial. Non-spatiality is supposedly what leads spiritualisms
into trouble with causal efficacy. So that trouble is sidestepped.
Well, yes, that trouble is avoided, but the other problems remain.
Worlds of perceptual consciousness may be spatially extended. But
Honderich makes clear that they are nevertheless numerically distinct
worlds. Nor are they identical with the physical world (or, I take it, any
part of it). But then what difference can they make, causally speaking,
so far as what goes on in the physical world is concerned? After all, if
we removed these worlds of perceptual consciousness, the physical
world would remain, and everything, presumably, would continue on
in it exactly as before. So why aren’t worlds of perceptual conscious-
ness epiphenomenal?
In particular, if we can explain everything that happens physically
entirely by reference to the physical, without our making any refer-
ence to worlds of perceptual consciousness or whatever goes on in
them at all, then aren’t worlds of perceptual consciousness
epiphenomenal?
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A Reply
To this, the reply may be that, while a world of perceptual conscious-
ness may not be identical with the physical world or any part of it, it
can nevertheless include physical objects. I am currently conscious of
this book. Therefore this very book constitutes a part of my world of
perceptual consciousness. As the book is a physical object, it can have
physical effects. But then, as my world of perceptual consciousness
includes the book, so it too is able to have physical effects.
This surely won’t do. Suppose this book tips over and knocks over a
vase. The book tipping over causes the vase to smash. And the book
tipping is part of my world of perceptual consciousness. So is this an
example of my world of perceptual consciousness having a physical
effect? That’s an odd-sounding conclusion to draw, to say the least.
But even if it did follow, it remains true to say that featuring in my
world of perceptual consciousness has nothing to do with the book’s
causal efficacy. Had my world of perceptual consciousness been
removed, the causal sequence that was played out in front of me — the
book tipping resulting in the vase smashing — would still have been
the same. We might put it like this. The event of the book’s tipping
may have a certain mental property — the property of falling within
my world of perceptual consciousness. But this mental property of the
event is causally irrelevant to how things play out physically. The
book would have done what it did anyway, whether or not it happened
to feature within my world of perceptual consciousness.
Of course, Honderich rightly points out that a world of perceptual
consciousness is causally dependent upon what’s going on physically.
It exists in part as a result of what’s going on neurologically. But of
course this doesn’t make worlds of perceptual consciousness any less
epiphenomenal. Honderich allows physical properties can have
effects on consciousness. The difficulty is in explaining how con-
sciousness is to have any physical effects. It does seem as if God could
have made a physically identical world, but without including any
worlds of perceptual consciousness at all. They add nothing so for as
how things play out physically is concerned.
But if Radical Externalism falls foul of these same classic difficul-
ties concerning the causal efficacy of the mental, then it seems it has
no very substantial advantage over the various spiritualisms to which
Honderich thinks it should be preferred.
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Does Radical Externalism do Justice to Subjectivity?
I’ll finish by briefly turning to the other horn of the dilemma about con-
sciousness — of how we are to do justice to the subjectivity of con-
sciousness. This is something Honderich claims ‘devout physicalisms’
fail to do. But does his own Radical Externalism fare any better?
Part of my difficulty here is in identifying precisely what worlds of
perceptual consciousness are supposed to include. The suggestion
seems to be that they can include real physical objects, as opposed to
mere subjective surrogates for them. Suppose, for example, that you
are conscious of this page. Honderich asks:
What did your consciousness seem to consist in? An answer can grow
on you fast. It was for the page to be there. What your consciousness
seemed to consist in was nothing other or more than that. In a better
sense of the words than employed by some philosophers, that is what it
was like for you to be conscious of the page and that is all that it was like
(p. 5).
The idea seems to be that your consciousness of the page is neither
more nor less than for the page itself to exist. Well, actually, that’s
obviously false, as the page can exist without you being conscious of
it. It’s not entirely clear what Honderich is after, here. But it does at
least seem that he wants to make the physical object itself feature in
your consciousness. He wants to include it (and not just some mental
surrogate for it) in your world of perceptual consciousness.
But earlier we noted that one of the criteria Honderich thinks any
adequate theory of consciousness should meet is to do justice to the
thought that when it comes to the realm of consciousness, the illusion/
reality distinction collapses. You can be mistaken about what’s objec-
tively there, but not about what’s subjectively there.
But then an obvious question arises — if real physical objects can
crop up in all their objective glory within worlds of perceptual con-
sciousness (as opposed to mere subjective surrogates — seemings,
sense- data, ideas, or whatever) why doesn’t that make possible exactly
the distinction between illusion and reality Honderich wants to avoid?
Perhaps it doesn’t, but I don’t yet see why it doesn’t. After all, it
may seem to me like there’s a book in my world of perceptual con-
sciousness, but as a matter of fact there isn’t. I’m hallucinating. So I’m
mistaken about what there is in my world of perceptual consciousness.
In a nutshell, the problem is this. It seems Honderich wants
to include real physical objects within worlds of perceptual
consciousness. But by including them, worlds of perceptual con-
sciousness no longer appear to be the infallibly given worlds it seems
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he requires them to be if his theory is to satisfy his own criterion con-
cerning illusion/reality.
Conclusion
In the preceding section, I raised a worry about how Radical
Externalism is supposed to explain what Honderich suggests any ade-
quate theory of consciousness should explain: namely the absence of
an illusion/reality distinction within the realm of consciousness. Per-
haps Radical Externalism can explain this, though I don’t yet see how.
This is merely a worry, however. Perhaps my inability to see how
Radical Externalism explains this is down to my not having fully
understood it. It seems to me that the more substantial difficulty facing
Radical Externalism concerns causal interaction. Perhaps Honderich
has solved one of the problems that plagued at least some
spiritualisms concerning causal interaction. But in my view the most
serious difficulties concerning causal interaction are just as much dif-
ficulties for Radical Externalism as they are for spiritualism. So, as it
stands, Radical Externalism seems to me to have no very substantial
advantage over spiritualism.
Like Honderich, I’m not keen on ‘spiritualism’ or ‘devout
physicalism’. I am persuaded that we probably should be looking for a
much more radical solution. Honderich’s Radical Externalism is bold,
imaginative and, I suspect, a very significant step in the right direc-
tion. But I am not persuaded that, as it stands, Radical Externalism
really does solve the causal interaction problem, as Honderich claims.
Not as it stands.
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REPLY TO LAW BY HONDERICH
Stephen Law in his independent and properly tough-minded piece
begins by agreeing, I take it, that devout physicalism — conscious-
ness itself is nothing but physical — can give no adequate account
of what has long been called the subjectivity of consciousness, no
account of the fact that your consciousness is not a thing, property,
fact or state of affairs about you like your location, DNA, weight,
synapses or the like.
He depends for his agreement, more than I do, on philosophical
thought-experiments about black and white rooms, fool’s pain and
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